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DOSSIER

The many kinds of objects that
technoscientific objects are
Os vários tipos de objetos que são os objetos
tecnocientíficos
Hugh Lacey1

ABSTRACT
Technoscientific objects are penetrating ever more profoundly into the socio-ecological systems that shape the contemporary lifeworld in ways that have brought about widely celebrated benefits, and also many kinds of risks for human health, the environment and society.
There are many kinds of technoscientific objects, such as physical, chemical or biological
objects that are outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made in
the course of research conducted in such areas as computer science, biotechnology, nanotechnology, neurosciences, geo-engineering, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence.
Moreover, every technoscientific object is itself an object of many kinds, not only an object
whose genesis, functioning and effective use are well understood in areas like these, but
also a social, economic, ecological and cultural object; and, for each kind that the object is,
there are associated specific causal mechanisms whose operations, when triggered in the
course of using it in the lifeworld, may lead to effects on and risks for human lives, social
arrangements and the environment (Section 1). I will illustrate these claims as they apply to
the exemplary technoscientific objects, transgenics (GMOs) used in agriculture (Section 2).
Then (Section 3), generalizing the discussion about transgenics, I will argue that appraising
the value and legitimacy of introducing and using technoscientific objects adequately requires being informed by the results of scientific investigation that take into account all the
kinds of things that they are, and (to the extent possible) all the causal mechanisms from
which the effects and risks of using them may arise.
Keywords: Technoscientific objects, transgenics, ecological and social responsibility.
RESUMO
Objetos tecnocientíficos estão penetrando cada vez mais profundamente nos sistemas socioecológicos que moldam a vida contemporânea de maneira a trazer benefícios amplamente celebrados e também muitos tipos de riscos para a saúde humana, o meio ambiente e a
sociedade. Existem muitos tipos de objetos tecnocientíficos, como objetos físicos, químicos
ou biológicos, resultantes de intervenções técnicas/experimentais/instrumentais feitas no curso de pesquisas em áreas como ciência da computação, biotecnologia, nanotecnologia, neurociências, geoengenharia, biologia sintética e inteligência artificial. Além disso, todo objeto
tecnocientífico é ele próprio um objeto de vários tipos, não apenas um objeto cuja gênese,
1
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funcionamento e uso efetivo são bem compreendidos em áreas como essas, mas também
um objeto social, econômico, ecológico e cultural; e, para cada tipo de objeto, existem mecanismos causais específicos associados cujas operações, quando desencadeadas em seu
uso no mundo da vida, podem levar a efeitos e riscos para vidas humanas, arranjos sociais e
meio ambiente (Seção 1). Ilustrarei essas alegações na medida em que se aplicam aos objetos
tecnocientíficos exemplares, transgênicos (OGM) usados na agricultura (Seção 2). Então, (na
Seção 3), generalizando a discussão sobre transgênicos, argumentarei que avaliar adequadamente o valor e a legitimidade da introdução e do uso de objetos tecnocientíficos exige que
se esteja informado pelos resultados da investigação científica que levam em consideração
todos os tipos de coisas que são, e (na medida do possível) todos os mecanismos causais dos
quais possam surgir os efeitos e riscos de seu uso.
Palavras-chave: Objetos tecnocientíficos, transgênicos, responsabilidade ecológica e social.

1. Technoscientific objects
1.1 Decontextualizing strategies2
The mainstream of the modern scientific tradition
has fostered research that utilizes methodological approaches that involve adopting decontextualizing strategies
(DSs). When DSs are adopted, the objects and phenomena being investigated are represented in dissociation from
their human, ecological and social contexts and the possibilities they may afford by virtue of being parts of those
contexts, and any links they may have with human agency,
sensory experience, social arrangements and ethical/social
value; the theories deployed and empirical data collected
do not deploy categories, routinely deployed for describing
and understanding what is experienced and for deliberating when making decisions, that are value-laden or needed
for describing contextual or qualitative sensory properties.
Under the most widely adopted DSs, theories, models and
hypotheses are constrained so that they are able to represent objects and phenomena, and encapsulate the possibilities they afford, in terms of their being generated from
their underlying structures and their components, their
processes and interactions, and the laws governing them;
and the empirical data that are selected to be sought for,
recorded and analysed are largely quantitative, obtained by
means of interventions made with measuring and recording instruments, and often of phenomena in experimental
spaces. Thus, e.g., in molecular biology and biotechnology,
transgenics are investigated for their genomic and molecular biological properties and the effects that are triggered
by these properties and changes of them; but not for the
effects of using them on the agroecosystems in which
they are planted and cultivated and in the specific socioeconomic contexts in which they have been developed,
produced, marketed and processed, and thus not for the
impact of using them on, e.g., biodiversity, the viability of
small-scale farming and worldwide food security.
2

Throughout the modern scientific tradition, DS-research (i.e., research conducted under DSs) has been closely linked with “the control of nature,” or with technological
developments (Mariconda, 2010; 2018) and prioritizing the
values of technological progress [VTP]. Adhering to VTP involves
according high ethical and social value to exercising control
over natural objects; to expanding human capacities to exercise such control (in technology) in more and more domains
– including the very small and the molecular biological, overcoming communication barriers and going to new places in
space; and to the definition of human, social and ecological
problems in terms that permit solutions using innovations
derived from DS-research (Lacey, 2010, p. 37-40).
While closely linked, the trajectories of DS-science
and technological progress have a measure of independence,
and some applications of knowledge obtained in DS-science
serve interests that embody values that are in tension with
VTP. Nevertheless, within the historical trajectory of modern
science, adopting DSs and adhering to VTP mutually reinforce
each other by virtue of relations obtaining between them,
such as that technological developments are furthered by
being informed by knowledge obtained in DS-research, and
DS-research often makes use of instruments and equipment
that are themselves adaptations of technological innovations
made possible because of advances of DS-research (Lacey,
1999, p. 117). DS-science may be conducted with the objective
of generating technological developments and furthering the
social embodiment of VTP. But, it need not be and often has
not been. Perhaps its most valued results come from investigations in basic or fundamental research, which aims only to expand established understanding of the underlying structures,
constituents, processes, interactions and laws of phenomena,
where DS-science is thought to contribute to the common
heritage of humankind available to be utilized (if and where
it can be) in service to interests of all value outlooks and not
favoring any of them at the expense of others. In addition,
(e.g.) most of the research results compiled by IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] on global warming

This section summarizes ideas developed in Lacey (1999, 2010, 2012, 2014) and Lacey & Mariconda (2014).
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and climate change, concerned with redressing the negative
effects generated by using technological objects or engaging
in the activities that produce raw materials needed for their
construction and use, is conducted under DSs.

1. 2 Technoscience and technoscientific
objects
Technoscience is DS-research that is conducted with the
objective of generating technological developments and furthering the social embodiment of VTP. It aims directly or indirectly:
(i) to generate novel technoscientific objects, physical/chemical/biological objects whose existence is (or depends on) the outcome
of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made
in the course of DS-research, and whose uses can be effectively
controlled to produce specified effects. And/or (ii) to produce
knowledge that can inform (and techniques and instruments
that enable) the genesis, development and production of technoscientific objects, explain their functioning and identify the
possibilities they afford for implementation in social practices
to bring about specific effects under certain conditions – this is
knowledge of events and states of affairs of novel domains and
about new possibilities of what we can do and make; and generating it makes use of the most advanced technology to produce
instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures. The aim (i) may be satisfied in the course of, e.g., space
exploration, testing cosmological or basic physical hypotheses,
and climate science, although not directly but as “spin-off ” from
research that needs to utilize objects and instruments that are
products of technoscientific innovation (that often need to be
devised as part of the research), and knowledge obtained in this
research may also be adapted to contribute to realizing aim (ii).
The science and technology (and basic and applied science) are
effectively so entangled in technoscience that there is little point
in attempting to separate them sharply. Furthermore, technoscientific objects are valued for their contributions to such areas
as medicine, agriculture, communications, energy and military
affairs that, at the same time, contribute to strengthening the
embodiment of VTP and – since nowadays interests that embody values of capital and the market [VC&M] have become the
principal bearers of VTP – also of VC&M. Thus, the horizons of
practical, industrial, medical or military uses of technoscientific innovations, and of economic growth, competition and other
values of VC&M, are usually clearly in view when the priorities of
technoscientific research are being determined.
It has become commonplace in contemporary scientific institutions to prioritize technoscientific research and,
for the spokespersons of many of them (and especially their
funding bodies), to identify the trajectory of science with that

of technoscience and even of commercially-oriented technoscience, i.e., technoscience conducted with the immediate aim
of producing innovative technoscientific objects that can be
used to strengthen VC&M (Lacey, 2012).3 Then, the value of
gaining understanding of the phenomena of nature becomes
subordinated to that of expanding knowledge of what we can
do with the technoscientific objects that we can make, and of
how (using them) we can expand our powers to exercise control
over natural (and technoscientific) objects, especially insofar
as they can contribute to furthering VC&M and other interests
of leading commercial bodies.

1.3 The many kinds of things that
technoscientific objects are
Technoscience investigates technoscientific objects only
qua outcomes of technoscientific research, and so objects that
embody knowledge obtained in DS-research. The impact of
using technoscientific objects, however, cannot be anticipated
in all of its details for, when introduced into the lifeworld, they
may obtain unanticipated uses sometimes in unanticipated environments; and it extends far beyond the direct outcomes of
the mechanisms of their internal functioning and producing
the specific effects desired by those who introduce them into
the lifeworld and control their use. It includes effects on human
beings and social and ecological systems – collateral effects of
using the objects for the sake of producing the effects desired by
their users – some of which may occur because their efficacious
functioning depends on their being located in certain kinds of
environments, whose creation and maintenance requires the
constant insertion of external inputs and the destruction of
earlier environments. Many of these effects, because of their
ecological and social dimensions, cannot be investigated in
DS-research. To investigate them, one must adopt strategies –
context-sensitive strategies [CSs] – that do not dissociate from
these dimensions. CSs have no place in science, when it is conceived as identical to technoscience or necessarily conducted
under DSs, but they are permitted in science conceived of as
multi-strategic research [M-SR] (Lacey, 2014; 2016).
In order to understand this multi-dimensional impact as
fully as possible one must keep in mind that, in addition to being outcomes of technoscientific research (objects that have
come into existence as outcomes of technical/experimental/
instrumental interventions made in the course of DS-research), technoscientific objects are also social, economic,
ecological and cultural objects. They are, e.g., components
of social/ecological systems that embody VTP and (most of
them) VC&M, as well as values specific to the areas (e.g., medicine) of their intended use.4

3
It is this tendency that explains the recent trend to evaluate the contribution of scientists in terms, not only of the empirical and theoretical results they have published but also of patents they have filed and gained (Oliveira, 2013).
4

This statement deploys categories (e.g., referring to embodied values) that have no place in theories and hypotheses investigated
under DSs, but it is clearly based on empirical evidence.
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In order to identify all the types of objects that technoscientific objects are, it would be necessary to identify
their causal powers, tendencies, affordances, origins, effects on
human beings and social/economic/ecological systems, and
how they differ from natural, non-technoscientific objects and
other kinds of technoscientific objects. Much of this cannot be
adequately done within DS-research and so within technoscientific research itself. It requires also engaging in CS-research. Thus, the knowledge that underlies the origins of
technoscientific objects and explains their efficacy (and its
limits) is not sufficient for understanding all the kinds of objects that they are and could become. And, technoscientific
research does not utilize the strategies (CSs) needed to investigate the mechanisms, connected with technoscientific
objects qua ecological and social objects (e.g., objects that
embody VC&M), that bring about some of the effects of using them in the social/ecological systems in which they may
be used. In the next section, I will illustrate the claims just
made as they apply to an exemplary class of technoscientific objects: transgenics, transgenic seeds and plants that are
actually being used (or whose use is anticipated) in agricultural practices that produce foodstuffs.5

2. Transgenics: exemplary
technoscientific objects
2.1 The kinds of objects that
transgenics are
The transgenics that are actually being used in agricultural practices are objects of at least the following kinds (cf.
Lacey, 2010, p. 205; 2017a):
(1) Biological organisms, objects that under appropriate conditions will grow into mature plants from which grain will be
harvested.
(2) Objects that incorporate scientific knowledge confirmed
in DS-research in disciplines such as molecular biology, genetics and biotechnology.
(3) Objects whose existence is the outcome of modifying the
genomes of plants by means of the experimentally-tested in-

terventions of genetic engineering, most of which currently
involve techniques of DNA-recombination.
(4) Objects that, when planted, are constituents of agroecosystems, whose other constituents include inputs many of
which are also technoscientific products, e.g., herbicides and
fertilizers6 that embody VTP and whose functioning depends
on implementing conditions that embody VC&M, e.g., availability of the required inputs, access to credit so that farmers
can purchase the needed seeds and inputs, legal enforcement
of the conditions on their purchase and sale of agricultural
products and of property rights.
(5) Objects that embody VTP.
(6) Objects that embody VC&M, for the most part commodities,
products of agribusiness corporations, brought into existence
to serve their interests, commercial objects inserted in the market (with worldwide dimensions) whose uses are constrained
by claims of intellectual property rights (Lacey, 2017a).7
It is by virtue of transgenics being objects of these kinds
that they have the causal powers, tendencies, affordances, origins, and effects on human beings and social/economic/ecological systems that they have, and are different from natural,
non-technoscientific objects and other kinds of technoscientific objects. The ontological view presupposed here8 sharply
conflicts with the reductionist neoCartesian view, according
to which what objects are (what their characteristic properties
are) can in principle be discovered in DS-research. The latter
view tends to be accepted implicitly by producers of transgenics and their allies in government, agricultural practices,
regulatory bodies and scientific institutions, who support the
widespread use of transgenics and their central role in food/
agricultural public policies. It holds that what transgenics are
is fully captured by (1)-(3) (perhaps with additional similar
items); and items (4)-(6) refer only to effects occasioned by
contingencies of their human uses whose causal origin is not
in the transgenics themselves.
There is further controversy connected with (4)-(6).
Those who hold the neoCartesian view and treat (4)-(6)
only as contingent generalizations question either their
truth, or completeness, or significance in connection with appraising the value and legitimacy of using transgenics. They
make claims like the following: The transgenics used in the
agroecosystems (described in (4)) also embody the values of

5
These transgenics are not the only kinds of genetically engineered organisms (GEOs). There are also, e.g., GE microorganisms and
mosquitos that have nothing directly to do with agriculture, GE fish and animals that have to do with producing foodstuffs, and GE crops
that produce, e.g., cotton or biofuels, rather than foodstuffs. Many but not all of my comments also apply to them.
6
Transgenics are engineered so that the efficacy of their use requires that they be planted in such agroecosystems. E.g., glyphosate-resistant transgenics are engineered to be used in agroecosystems in which crops are appropriately sprayed with glyphosate.
7

The plants whose genomes are modified (or ancestors of them) were already cultivated in agricultural fields or found in natural ecosystems; but genetically engineered possibilities could not have been realized by means of the mechanisms of natural selection or methods
of crossbreeding used by traditional and indigenous farmers and conventional plant breeders. Many of them, thus, also incorporate
the traditional and indigenous knowledge that informed the selection practices that gave rise to them. Note that it is by virtue of being
objects of kinds (2) and (3) that intellectual property rights can be claimed to transgenics (seeds and plants) – although the knowledge
obtained under DSs that they incorporate applies to only tiny fragments of their genomes, much larger fragments of which incorporate
traditional and indigenous knowledge (Lacey, 2010, Chapter 6; 2017a).
8

My formulation of this ontological view, which there is no space to elaborate here, draws on Bhaskar (2014).
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preserving sustainability (e.g., reducing pollution of soils and
waters) and reducing the health risks of agricultural workers (e.g., less exposure to agrotoxics); by virtue of embodying
VTP and being sources of food products that are consumed
by many human beings and animals, they also embody such
values as safely meeting the food and nourishment needs of
those who consume them and furthering the realization of
the right to food security throughout the world; and, by virtue of embodying VC&M, they are part of the socioeconomic
system that furthers the embodiment of VTP with its accompanying desirable consequences. Opposing these claims, proponents of agroecology and food sovereignty maintain that,
in the agroecosystems and under the socioeconomic conditions in which transgenics are actually used, all other values
are subordinated to VC&M, leading to destructive social and
environmental consequences, including weakening the widespread realization of the right to food security and massive
destruction of biodiversity.
DS-research lacks the conceptual/theoretical resources
to resolve this controversy. Certainly the claims of the proponents cannot be supported within DS-research: the formulation of items (4)-(6), and of the contingent generalizations said to replace them as well as the claims stated in the
previous paragraph, requires categories that have no place in
theories and hypotheses investigated under DSs; and investigating the effects of using transgenics and their products (and
the mechanisms that occasion them) on human beings, social arrangements and ecological systems in the contexts of
their use is beyond its purview. Addressing the controversy
requires conducting investigations under appropriate CSs
that entertain theories and hypotheses that deploy categories
(e.g., categories apt for describing what values are embodied
in objects) that are not reducible to those of DSs. Thus, what
transgenics are – all of the kinds of objects that they are – and
the full range of the effects of using them cannot be grasped
by means of the same kind of research (conducted under DSs
in molecular biology and biotechnology) that generated them
in the first place and that testifies to their efficacy. Neither
can it be grasped that agricultural practices, like agroecology
that embody competing values (of social justice, democratic
participation and sustainability), would be undermined by
introducing transgenics into them (Lacey, 2015a; 2015b).9 In
order to grasp these things, it is necessary to adopt CSs that
enable the investigation of, e.g., the effects of using transgenics
qua objects that embody the values of VTP and VC&M.
Hence, the value and legitimacy of using transgenics
cannot be adequately appraised when deliberations are carried out deploying only the conceptual framework (limited
to categories permitted in theories developed under DSs)
9

in which the research, development and implementation of
transgenics take place – or from the demonstrated efficacy of
using them in the conditions in which they are used, or from
the stated objectives (or good intentions) of their producers
and users. It depends also on (i) what their actual benefits
are, who benefits from them, and whether the benefits can
be shared evenhandedly; (ii) the safety of using them in the
agroecosystems of their actual use and under the socioeconomic conditions of their production, distribution, processing
and consumption – and, hence, on whether or not their actual use has occasioned harm, or is likely to occasion potential
harmful effects (risks); and (iii) what the viable alternatives to
using them may be, and how their likely benefits and safety
compare with those of using transgenics. Appraising the value
and legitimacy of using transgenics, therefore, requires investigation concerning these three issues. In this article I will focus on risks; investigating them requires adopting appropriate
CSs, as well as DSs.

2.2 The many kinds of risks that using
transgenics occasions
One of the key premises of arguments defending the
legitimacy of the central role for transgenics in agricultural
practices and policies is that the current (and anticipated)
uses of transgenics – their production, planting, cultivation,
harvesting, processing, distribution and consumption – are
safe; i.e., that using them occasions no significant risks for
human health, society and the environment (that cannot
be managed and contained by implementing and enforcing
scientifically informed regulations). I will label this claim
“no risks.” It is said to have a strong basis in empirical investigations of risks.10 However, the proponents of transgenics
and official organs, e.g., CTNBio,11 which are responsible for
making decisions about liberating varieties of transgenics for
agricultural use, tend to hold the view that transgenics are essentially objects only of the kinds (1)-(3). Their risk analyses,
consequently, do not take into account all of the kinds of risks
that are potentially occasioned, but only those occasioned (in
the words of some scientists who have served on CTNBio),
by the “direct and specific impact of GMOs [transgenics]
on nature” (de Andrade et al., 2015). This is the impact derived from using them considered only qua objects of kinds
(1)-(3), that occasioned by mechanisms triggered by events
within the modified genomes of the transgenics that can be
described using categories utilized in DS-research. Investigating this impact, no matter how well the investigations may be
conducted, cannot provide sufficient evidence to support “no

For discussion of the CSs used in research in agroecology, see Lacey (2015a).

10

It has been said that there is a scientific consensus supporting “no risks,” at least insofar as it concerns consuming the products derived from transgenics. This is incorrect – see Ferment et al. (2015); Hilbeck et al. (2015); Krimsky (2019)

11

CTNBio – Comissão Técnica Nacional de Biossegurança, the Brazilian body responsible for assessing the safety of transgenics before
their release for agricultural use.
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risks,” but at most evidence to support the more limited claim:
“There are no risks of using (especially consuming) transgenics and their products that are occasioned by the ‘direct and
specific impact of transgenics on nature’.”12 But the more limited claim could be well confirmed, and at the same time “no
risks” be disconfirmed by the results of CS-research conducted on the risks of using transgenics considered qua objects of
kinds (4)-(6) – and the preponderance of available evidence
supports that “no risks” is false.
To see this more clearly, consider a particular variety of
transgenics – call it V (e.g., a variety of soy beans resistant to
glyphosate). Suppose that it has been convincingly established
that there are no risks (to health and environment) occasioned by the “direct and specific impact” of V on nature (by
virtue of mechanisms triggered by events within V’s modified
genome). Since V is accompanied by inputs of glyphosate in
the agroecosystems in which it is grown, however, that would
imply nothing about the safety of planting, cultivating and
harvesting V. There could be, e.g., health risks occasioned for
consumers of the processed products of V because of residue
of the agrotoxics that has not been removed, and for farm
workers and their communities because of exposure to the
agrotoxics. These are not idle possibilities. E.g., reports in Argentina and Brazil (and elsewhere) have documented serious
health problems occasioned by exposure to glyphosate, the
main active ingredient of the herbicide, Roundup, to which
the most widely used transgenics have been engineered to be
tolerant (Carneiro et al., 2015; Gillam, 2017; Paganelli et al,,
2010; Ruschel, 2019). Even if it is well confirmed that there
are no risks occasioned by events within the modified genome
of V, that does not suffice to support “no risks,” for there are
risks occasioned by using V qua object of kind (4).
Thus, in order to test “using V occasions no risks,” one
must investigate the effects of using glyphosate as a herbicide in the fields where the glyphosate-resistant V is grown.
It is not an adequate substitute to follow procedures that
require analyzing the effects of using transgenics and glyphosate separately – where the effects of growing and consuming V are investigated in laboratory or small-scale field
studies in which V is grown without using glyphosate, and
the effects of consumption of and exposure to glyphosate in
other investigations – unless there were empirical evidence
supporting that there are no additional or interacting factors that might affect the safety of using V. V, used in contexts different from those of its normal agricultural use, may

be safe; but that has no implications for its safety where it is
encountered by human beings in the agroecosystems of its
actual use. V was developed to be resistant to glyphosate so
that it could be grown in agroecosystems in which glyphosate would be an active presence, and it has no agricultural
uses otherwise; and glyphosate is present in those agroecosystems because V is being grown there; and any effects its
use may occasion in them are a consequence of its association with V. V, in the agroecosystems in which it is actually
used, is an object of kind (4). Nevertheless, according to De
Andrade et al. (2015), the mandate of CTNBio is confined
to analyzing the “direct and specific impact” of transgenics;
appraising the effects of using agrotoxics (e.g., glyphosate) in
managing transgenic crops is outside of its mandated purview; and risk assessment of using agrotoxics, a matter that
has to do with “other aspects of the technology,” needs to be
(and is) conducted by other bodies.13 Moreover, according
to this article, separating the procedures involved in analyzing the two kinds of risks (those deriving from the direct
and specific impact of transgenics on nature, and those from
other aspects of the technology) is part of a “technical stance
accepted and deployed throughout the world in accordance
with international treaties and accords concerning commerce and protection of health and the environment” (author’s translation), a stance that would be reasonable only if
transgenics were objects only of kinds (1)–(3), and if safety
studies of using them need only take into account risks that
may be occasioned by virtue of transgenics being objects of
these kinds.14
In addition to the risks of using transgenics considered qua objects of kind (4), there are also risks (and harm
that may have already occurred) occasioned by mechanisms triggered by using them qua objects of kinds (5) and
(6). They include environmental risks: e.g., loss of biodiversity due to planting transgenics in monocultures, and
degradation of soils (elimination of microorganisms and
fungi in them) and water supplies because of intensive and
prolonged use of agrotoxics. And social risks: e.g., threats
to the food security of those who lose their lands because
of the expansion of agribusiness that fosters the use of
transgenics, monopolization of the world’s seed markets,
and undermining of alternative approaches to agriculture
(e.g., agroecology) and conditions that favor ensuring food
security for poor communities (Holt-Giménez, 2019).15
These risks are occasioned by growing all the varieties of

12

Because of risks that were detected, some varieties of transgenics were not liberated for use. So, a more accurate formulation would
be: “There are no risks of these kinds that cannot be detected in DS-investigations, and none have been detected concerning the varieties that have been liberated for agricultural use; and risk assessments of these kinds made before liberating new varieties are likely to
detect in advance any serious risks, so that risk-incurring varieties would not be released.”

13

De Andrade et al. (2015) is a response to Lacey et al. (2015a), and is responded to in Lacey et al. (2015b).

14

For those who identify “scientific” methodologies in terms of using only DSs, studies of this kind are considered to be “scientific
risk (or safety) studies” and CS-research is not considered to have sound scientific credentials. It is sometimes maintained that the deliberations of regulatory organs should be informed only by the results of “scientific” studies. I have argued elsewhere (Lacey, 2019a)
that this view of scientific methodology is a significant cause of maintaining ignorance about the serious risks occasioned in the light of
transgenics being objects of types (4)-(6).
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transgenics currently liberated for use, and exacerbated by
the totality and extent of plantings of them and by the aggressive introduction of their processed products into the
world’s food system in programs shaped by agribusiness,
food companies and policies of governments and international trade bodies (Lacey, 2017b).
When only the two-track procedure (described in de
Andrade et al., 2015) is followed, sound endorsements of the
safety of using transgenics cannot be made. Even if it were
soundly established that there are no risks deriving from the
“direct and specific impact” of using them, that does not establish that it is safe to use them in the agroecosystems in
which they are used under the conditions of their use, and to
consume their products. Following that procedure, and effectively appraising the safety of using transgenics only qua objects of the kinds (1)–(3), may serve the interests of agribusiness and some of its clients that profit from the production
and uses of transgenics, and governments that encourage the
growth of crops for export. But it fails to address adequately
issues of safety that arise in the agroecosystems of their use,
e.g., about the harmful effects on the health of farmers and
communities that become exposed to agrotoxics, and it leads
to rejecting the rationale for taking precautionary measures
aimed at preventing or minimizing the impact of the harmful
effects (Lacey, 2019a).
Agribusiness and its allies sometimes point out that the
risks occasioned by mechanisms connected with transgenics
being objects of kinds (4)–(6) are also occasioned in “conventional” farming (based on using hybrids, agrochemicals including agrotoxics and intense mechanization) by essentially
the same kinds of ecological and socioeconomic mechanisms;
that these risks predated the introduction of transgenics; and
that they are still occasioned in situations where “conventional” farming is not replaced by transgenics. Hence, they conclude, it is just “ideological” to attribute these risks to using
transgenics. It is true that risks of these kinds are endemic to
the hegemonic food/agricultural system, that in other (earlier) situations there are different mechanisms for occasioning
them, and that the role that transgenics have come to play in
shaping the trajectory of the system is explained by the interests well served by the system. Nevertheless, these facts do
not challenge that currently mechanisms connected with using transgenics play the central role in occasioning these risks.
Furthermore, proponents of using transgenics have
maintained that risks like these are more than counterbalanced by the benefits obtained, since (they claim) there are
no alternatives to the agricultural use of transgenics (and
their technoscientific successors) that would not occasion
worse risks, e.g., the risk of not producing enough food to
feed and nourish the world’s population. But no alternatives

cannot be investigated without adopting CSs, for to confirm
it, research would have to be conducted on the possibilities
of farming practices like agroecology whose core practices
are not principally informed by knowledge obtained under
DSs.16 As things stand, no alternatives has not been established in the course of empirical investigations, and the preponderance of evidence (obtained in CS-research) is against
it (Lacey, 2015b; 2017a; 2017b).
It matters that transgenics are objects of many kinds.
Thinking of them as objects only of the kinds (1)–(3) helps
to consolidate the myth that transgenics may be used to serve
interests linked with virtually any values (Lacey, 2017a). Not
recognizing that they are also objects of kinds (4)–(6) enables
misleading judgments to be made about what can be expected from using transgenics on a wide scale (Lacey, 2017b); and
it leads to ignoring the possibilities of non-technoscientific alternatives (e.g., agroecology) that embody, not VTP and VC&M,
but the values of social justice, participatory democracy and
environmental sustainability (Lacey, 2015a; 2015b).

3. The value and legitimacy
of introducing and using
technoscientific objects
Transgenics are exemplary technoscientific objects
(Lacey, 2017a); consequently, although most technoscientific objects are not biological objects, much of the discussion
about transgenics can be generalized to technoscientific objects in general. Technoscientific objects being used in the
lifeworld can be shown one-by-one to be themselves objects
of many kinds, including ecological and social objects; and appraising their value and legitimacy requires considering and
investigating them qua all the kinds of objects that they are.
Just as transgenics are not only objects of kinds (1)–(3),
other kinds of technoscientific objects are not only physical/
chemical/biological objects that have come into existence as
outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made in the course of DS-research. And, just as transgenics are objects of kinds (4)–(6), they too are objects of
daily life, human experience, social arrangements, productive
activities, and institutional practices. Moreover, since their
functioning in social practices requires that certain material,
ecological and social conditions be in place (e.g., availability of
necessary inputs for their functioning, and the socioeconomic
structures that ensure their continued availability), they are
also components of social/ecological systems that embody
VTP and (typically) VC&M, as well as values specific to the areas of their intended uses. Establishing and maintaining the

15

Also, recent increases in obesity and other health problems have been attributed to programs that lead to expansion of consumption
of ‘junk foods’, programs made more efficient by processing transgenics (Jacobs & Richtel, 2017).

16

Perhaps DS-research might suffice to establish “no alternatives within the trajectory of the hegemonic food/industrial system,” but no
alternatives does not follow from this. Agroecology, e.g., is an alternative in tension with this trajectory (Lacey, 2015b).
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conditions, as well as using the technoscientific objects where
they obtain, has material, ecological, human, economic and
social effects. Many of them are of ethical significance, and so
need to be taken into account in deliberations concerning the
value and legitimacy of using technoscientific objects. This is
especially important when they are introduced supposedly as
parts of solutions to social problems – as introducing transgenics is said by its proponents to contribute to solving the
problem of worldwide hunger – for maintaining the conditions might be incompatible with solving the problem. Critics
of using the transgenics currently in use and development,
e.g., have argued that agribusiness control of the food/agricultural system is incompatible with eliminating hunger in poor
areas of the world (Lacey, 2015b; 2017b; see note 18). And
many people directly affected by the consequences of climate
change, pollution and destruction of biodiversity worry that
maintaining socioeconomic conditions in which VTP and
VC&M are highly embodied in the hegemonic institutions and
social practices (to the detriment of the values of social justice, democratic participation and environmental sustainability) is incompatible with mitigating problems like these that
threaten the future of humanity.
These matters cannot be investigated adequately in
technoscience itself where only DSs are adopted, or discussed
in ways that are informed by appropriate scientific input in
contexts where technoscientific objects are considered only
qua objects that are products of technoscientific research,
and not also as objects qua constituents of social-ecological
systems, objects that embody VTP and typically VC&M. Since
modern science privileges the adoption of DSs (leading to the
virtual exclusion of CSs), these matters have not been adequately investigated in modern science. That partly accounts
for the fact that climate change was not foreseen as a potential consequence of the widespread introduction into social
practices of the technoscientific objects (given the economic
conditions of their implementation and maintenance) whose
uses occasion large greenhouse gas emissions; and how to mitigate the effects of climate change will not be adequately investigated so long as that trajectory of science is largely identified with that of technoscience (or commercially-oriented
technoscience).
The privileged place granted to adopting DSs is linked
with the widespread social adherence to VTP, the profound
embodiment of VTP in modern social institutions, and not
systematically subordinating VTP to interests connected with
ethical and social values other than (sometimes) VC&M (Lacey,
2010, Chapter 1; Lacey & Mariconda, 2014). Thus, adhering
to VTP easily leads to according prima facie legitimacy to implementing demonstrably efficacious technoscientific inno17

vations without delay (considering them only qua outcomes
of technoscientific research) so that the expected benefits of
using them may be obtained as quickly as possible, and even to
tolerating a considerable measure of social and environmental
disruption for its sake – provided only that, following investigations (conducted under DSs) of their “direct and specific
impact” on health and environment, appropriate experts or
official organs (like, in the case of transgenics, CTNBio) judge
that they would not occasion serious risks (Lacey, 2016). This
presumption of legitimacy – untested by the consideration of
risks that need CSs for their investigation – is strengthened
when VTP are interpreted (in commercially-oriented technoscience) in the light of VC&M.
In the dominant social, economic and political institutions of economically advanced societies VTP and VC&M are
often taken for granted. This helps to explain why it is largely ignored that technoscientific objects are objects of many
kinds and that there are potential risks of using them that
are occasioned by virtue of all the kinds of objects that they
are, and why research conducted under CSs is marginalized.
Nevertheless, this explanation should not disguise that it is
reasonable to adhere to VTP only if claims like the following
can be endorsed following relevant empirical investigation
(Lacey, 2010, p. 39): (a) On-going technoscientific innovation expands human potential and provides benefits that can
be made available to all human beings. (b) Technoscientific
solutions can be found for virtually all practical problems (in
medicine, agriculture, communications, transportation, energy provision, etc.), including those occasioned by the “collateral effects” of using technoscientific objects themselves. (c)
For most of these problems there are only technoscientific
solutions. (d) The values of technological progress represent
a set of universal values that must be part of any viable value
outlook today – there are no viable alternatives.
Items (a)–(d) are not value judgments. They are claims
open to being tested empirically in investigations that (given their social, historical and value aspects) would require
the adoption of relevant CSs. Thus they fall outside of the
purview of technoscience.17 When technoscientific objects
are recognized as being the many kinds of objects that they
are, and the relevant CSs are adopted, available facts provide
grounds for not hastily assuming that (a)–(d) would withstand systematic empirical scrutiny. Re (a): the benefits of
technological “progress” to date have not been made available
to many poor and indigenous peoples. Re (b): technoscientific solutions proposed to address world hunger (including
using transgenics) have not delivered (Lacey, 2015b) and
those proposed to mitigate climate change remain mired in
ambiguity; and none are available to address the risks of using

Ironically (and perhaps paradoxically), investigating presuppositions of marginalizing CSs requires adopting CSs.

18

Accompanying (b) there is often the unarticulated assumption that to produce solutions to problems it is not necessary to know about
the causal network that has produced them and sustains them. Those who propose that using transgenics is key to solving the problem
of world hunger rarely address the socioeconomic causes of hunger, and so do not address how hunger can be redressed adequately
without eliminating those causes.
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transgenics considered qua objects of kinds (4)–(6).18 Re (c):
there is promising evidence that agroecology (an approach to
farming whose essentials are not informed by technoscience)
is the key to moving towards addressing the problem of hunger (Lacey, 2015a). Re (d): practices that embody the values
of social justice, respect for the full range of human rights,
environmental sustainability and democratic participation
(embodied in agroecological and associated practices in other
areas, as well as many popular social movements throughout
the world, including in Brazil) constitute prospectively a viable alternative to those that embody VTP and VC&M (Lacey,
2015a; 2015b).19
All of these issues are obscured when it is ignored that
technoscientific objects are objects of many kinds. In contrast,
when it is recognized, items (a)–(d) and adhering to VTP and
VC&M all become matters of contestation, and the ground is
undercut for the casual assumption of the value and legitimacy of using technoscientific innovations, provided only that
DS-scientific investigations show that their “direct and specific impact” does not involve seriously harmful effects. Then, it
becomes apparent that appraising the value and legitimacy of
using technoscientific innovations needs to take into account
(to the extent possible) all the risks of using them, that risks
might be occasioned by mechanisms grounded in any of the
kinds of things that they are, and that the seriousness of the
risks needs to be evaluated in the light of what alternatives are
and could be available. This requires going beyond the limits
of technoscience and being responsive to research conducted
under CSs (as well as DSs). It also requires taking precautionary measures to ensure that an innovation is not introduced
into the lifeworld unless a sufficient range of risks and alternatives has been investigated. These measures are needed to
make time available in order to develop the conceptual resources required in the investigations, to deal with the threats
of climate change (and other threats, such as those derived
from using transgenics and their successors), and to allow
for democratically supported alternatives to demonstrate
whatever promise they might have – so that further harm
that may be occasioned by using technoscientific innovations
could be minimized (if not eliminated).20 Thus (see Lacey,
2016; 2019a), responsibly appraising the value and legitimacy of using technoscientific innovations requires, on the one
hand, that research conducted in technoscience be accompanied by commensurate research (deploying appropriate CSs)
on the long-term, often worldwide, potentially irreversible
ecological and social consequences of introducing the innovation into the lifeworld, taking into account all of the kinds

of objects that the innovations are and the socioeconomic
conditions of the planned introductions and the actual conditions of use; and, on the other hand, that adequate research be
conducted that investigates the full array of alternatives that
are proposed by participants in democratic societies.
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